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LAW AND VALUES IN GOVERNANCE:
THE SINGAPORE WAY
U
Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan*
The article examines the role of law and the legal system in catalysing Singapore's
development success. It argues that there is a dichotomy in the approach with regard
to commercial law and law relating to individual freedom and rights and civil society.
Universalism characterises the treatment of commercial laws while cultural relativism
and a communitarian-based understanding of rights and obligations are features of the
law relating to the rights of the individual. Instrumentalism, driven by a particularistic
'communitarian' political philosophy underpinned by strong Confucianist values, is
very much motivated by the need for good governance as a prerequisite for economic
growth and to nourish the nascent nation-building process. This helps to explain the
universalism-relativism dichotomy in the approach to different laws. While it is argued
that there is a strong element of instrumentality in its treatment of the legal system and
the law, the government has always been careful to ensure that the laws and the legal
system enjoy widespread public support and legitimacy. Such a trend is also anticipated
for the Hong Kong SAR, another ethnic Chinese-majority political entity, provided
that political expediency and a neo-colonial attitude are not the motivating concerns
of the Beijing government.
Introduction
The 'East Asian Miracle' had been forlornly described as a myth during the
economic tailspin that swept across the region in the last years of the twentieth-
century. Singapore has, however, weathered the turmoil relatively well. This
can be attributed to the premium placed on good governance, engendering an
abiding commitment to a stable and efficient legal system coupled with respect
for laws and authority ever since sudden statehood was thrusted upon Singapore.
Yet one can discern a norm of instrumentality in the treatment of law vis-A-vis
the government's development agenda and a dichotomy in the approach
towards law in the commercial and non-commercial spheres.
Singapore has acceded to many international treaties in the economic and
commercial arena. Characterised by universal applicability and conformity to
international norms 'universalism' distinguishes the legal regime governing
economic activity in Singapore. On the other hand, cultural relativism and a
communitarian-based understanding of rights and obligations are features of
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the approach towards law relating to the rights of the individual. The
internationalisation of law in supposedly cultural-specific and value-laden
areas, like political governance and human rights, is deliberately limited.'
Lacking natural resources, the constant and near-obsessive concern with
survival and a siege mentality heightens the need for law, order and social
discipline as the cornerstones of a viable open economy and sovereign state.
Foreign critics have described the laws relating to individuals and non-
governmental organisations as unduly harsh for the alleged abuses of human
rights and curtailment of civil liberties.2 The Singapore government has
justified the 'different standard' used in matters of personal liberty on the basis
of cultural relativism and a communitarian-based understanding of rights and
obligations. Within the communitarian framework, law is a means to the end
of enhancing and enforcing state interests and objectives, as defined by the
political 6lites. 3
This article is divided into three parts. In the first part, a sketch of the
political and legal system and the sources of law in Singapore are presented.
The views of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on the role of law in
developing Singapore, in particular the instilling of social discipline are also
considered. Lee's views still resonate within the Singapore political 6lites'
psyche. Part Two considers the approach towards laws relating to individuals
and civil society. Part Three examines the universalistic approach towards
commercial law in Singapore in creating a business-friendly environment as a
sine qua non for a state that needs to remain plugged into the international
economic architecture. In Parts Two and Three, references will be made to
selected laws to explicate the nuanced yet different approaches towards the
different fields of law. Although this article's focus is Singapore, a brief attempt
will also be made to compare Singapore's experience with that of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) on the role of law and values
in the governance of two (predominantly Chinese) former British island
colonies.4 Given the political realities and matrix in Chinese politics, it is
suggested that the Chinese political values would increasingly influence the
development of the Hong Kong SAR. The overlaying of the British Hong
Kong system with a different value and legal system would ultimately result,
like in Singapore's case, in an autochthonous politico-legal system.
1 See discussion in Simon S C Tay, 'The Singapore Legal System and International Law: Influence or
Interference,' in Kevin Y L Tan (ed), The Singapore Legal System (Singapore: Singapore University
Press, 2nd ed, 1999).
2 See, for example, Beatrice S Frank, et al, The Decline in the Rule of Law in Singapore and Malaysia: A
Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (New York: The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1990); and Asia Watch,
Silencing all Critics: Human Rights Violations in Singapore (New York: Asia-Watch, 1989).
3 For an exposition of the statist understanding of the rule of law vis-6-vis state-building and a managed
form of capitalism, see introduction in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed), Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia:
The Rule of Law and Legal Institutions (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
4 Despite the apparent similarities, Hong Kong and Singapore are very different societies.
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Political and legal framework: autochthonous innovations to colonial
legacy
The Singapore government's ability to implement constitutional and legal
changes stems from the ruling People's Action Party's hegemonic dominance
of the political system. Since 9 August 1965, Singapore has been a sovereign
republic with a Westminster-modelled parliamentary system of government.
The organs of state - the executive, the legislature and the judiciary - are
provided for in a written constitution. The Head of State is the President,
although elected by popular mandate, exercises essentially custodial powers
and ceremonial duties. From 1968 to 1981, the People's Action Party (PAP)
was the only elected party in Parliament. Even then, the PAP had more than
a two-thirds majority in Parliament. This allowed the PAP government to
make fundamental and swift changes to Singapore society through the legal
system. In the last general elections in January 1997, the PAP won 81 of 83
seats. The PAP also increased its share of total votes polled to about 65 percent
from 61 percent in the 1991 electioni
The inherited common law based legal system is a legacy of Singapore's
British colonial past, which began when Sir Stamford Raffles of the British East
India Company founded Singapore in 1819.6 The development of an
autochthonous legal system is a more recent phenomenon. The current Chief
Justice has underscored the importance of evolving 'a body of autochthonous
case law, capable of responding to the needs and concerns of the people who
live and do business in Singapore'.7 Indeed, the confidence that accompanied
successful state building bred further confidence and the belief that Western
models are not entirely appropriate for Singapore. This dovetails with the
abiding belief in the patent need of a 'Singapore way': a model of development
that is coterminous with her societal values and development objectives, in
contradistinction to prevailing Western norms.
The judiciary
Until recently, Singapore's highest court was the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in London. With the abolishment of all rights of appeal to the
Privy Council since 8 April 1994, the final appellate court in Singapore for both
civil and criminal matters is the Singapore Court of Appeal. Given that
5 For a recent analysis of PAP's political dominance, see James V Jesudason, 'The Resilience of One.
Party Dominance in Malaysia and Singapore,' in Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins (eds), The
Awkward Embrace: One-party Dominaton and Democracy (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999).
6 See also Helena H M Chan, The Legal System of Singapore (Singapore; Butterworths, 1995).
7 Yong Pung How, 'The Courts in the 21st Century: A Framework for Change,' in Arun Mahi2hnan
and Lee Tsao Yuan (eds), Singapore: Re-engineening Success (Singapore: Oxford University Press,
1998). The case for autochthony was first argued by Andrew Phang in his The Development of
Singapore Law: Historical and Socio.Legal Perspectives (Singapore: Butterworths, 1990).
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economic prosperity is of vital importance, the government cut the juridical
apron strings only when the legal system had gained the confidence and trust
of the international business community. In part, the delay of almost 30 years
after independence in having an indigenous court as the highest court was the
conscious consideration that the legal system plays a vital role in attracting
global capital.
The aim of an efficient legal system is very much driven by the government,
with full support of the judiciary. In recent years, there have been many
appointments of Judicial Commissioners (JCs) to complement the Supreme
Court Judges. Although they exercise the powers and perform the functions of
a Supreme Court Judge, JCs do not enjoy security of tenure and are appointed
for such period(s) as the President thinks fit.8 Many JCs were appointed after
Justice Yong Pung How's elevation to Chief Justiceship in September 1990.
The aim was to clear 'the problem of a large and embarrassing backlog' of cases.
With the backlog now cleared, the trend is towards providing 'useful exposure
to judicial experience' to practising lawyers, government legal officers and law
academics.9
The Subordinate Courts play a vital role in the administration of justice in
Singapore as an estimated ninety-five percent of all court cases in Singapore are
handled in these courts."0 Under the Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321), a
District Judge and a Magistrate can be appointed after a minimum of five years
and one year respectively as a 'qualified person' under the Legal Profession Act
(Cap 161)." As public servants, the judicial officers in the Subordinate Courts
do not enjoy security of tenure but their powers are fairly extensive. For
instance, a District Court can impose, upon conviction, sentences of jail terms
up to seven years, a maximum fine of S$10,000 and 12 strokes of the cane as well
as reformative training. In civil cases, they have the jurisdiction to hear cases
where the amount claimed does not exceed S$250,000. A Magistrates' Court
can pass jail terms up to two years, a maximum fine of S$2,000 and 6 strokes of
the cane. 2 In civil matters, the jurisdiction of Magistrates' Courts is limited to
claims not exceeding S$60,000. These officers are moved regularly between the
Attorney-General's Chambers and the Subordinate Courts; it is this regular
movement of the lower level judicial officers between the two offices, Jayasuriya
Article 94(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1999 Reprint.
Remarks of ChiefJustice Yong Pung How at his Welcome Reference, 8 October 1990. See Hoo Sheau
Peng, Lee Shen Dee, Phang Hsiao Chung and See Kee Onn (eds), Speeches and Judgements of Chief
Justice Yong Pung Hov (Singapore: FT Law and Tax Asia Pacific, 1996), 27.10 prising of the District Court, Magistrates' Court, Family Court, Juvenile Court, Coroner's Court
and the Small Claims Tribunal, e S Subordinate Courts are presided over by the Senior District Judge
and other judicial officers. See the Subordinate Courts' Internet website, http:/www.gov.sg/judiciary/subc/indexl html
n See ss 9(3) and 10(2), Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321). The requirements for a 'qualified person'
are found in s 2, Legal Profession Act (Cap 161).12 Sections 11(3) and 11(5), Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68).
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argues, that allows for the 'inoculation of Singapore's corporatist ideology'
within the judiciary. 13
The values of a society are often reflected in its laws and legal system. For
instance, the Family Court, established in March 1995, is in line with the
national value of family as the basic unit of society. It has the jurisdiction of a
District Court and is a one-stop centre for all family law-related matters. 14
There is also the Maintenance of Parents Act (Cap 167B) by which parents can
seek legal redress if their children do not adequately support them in their old
age. In line with the aim of encouraging a non-litigious population, the Small
Claims Tribunal, set up in 1985, is meant to be an inexpensive and informal
means of settling disputes. It has the jurisdiction to hear and determine any
claim relating to a dispute arising from any contract for the sale of goods or the
provision of services. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to claims of up
to S$10,000 or, if the parties consent, claims of up to S$20,000. No lawyers are
allowed in cases before the Small Claims Tribunal. Additionally, alternative
dispute resolutions encompassing arbitration, negotiation, and mediation are
strongly advocated over litigation. 5 This is also consistent with the prevailing
commercial trends towards non-litigious modes of settling disputes. Within the
Subordinate Court, the supporting institutional mechanism is the recently
created Primary Dispute Resolution Centre, which aspires 'towards a model of
mediation which will suit the multi-cultural Singaporean context'.16 Two
Community Mediation Centres have also been established to promote local
community mediation.
Sources of law: instilling the Singapore element
The variety of sources of law reflects Singapore's historical development from
a British colony to its short-lived membership in Malaysia, and to the measured
quest to develop an autochthonous legal system.17 One consistent theme that
runs through these major constitutional changes is the securing of the continuing
13 Kanishka Jayasuriya, 'Corporatism and Judicial Independence within Statist Legal Institutions in
East Asia,' in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed), Law, Capitalism and Power ir Asia, (note 3 above) p 185.
14 The Family Court seeks to promote the harmonious resolution of family disputes. Mediation and
counselling services are provided as part of the Court's set-up. The Court hears all applications for
maintenance, protection and adoption orders as well as applications involving property disputes
between spouses, petitions for matrimonial relief and ancillary applications under the Women's
Charter (Cap 353).15 For a discussion of the alternative dispute resolution regime in Singapore, see Joel Lee Tye Beng, 'The
ADR Movement in Singapore,' in Kevin Y L Tan (ed), The Singapore Legal System.
16 See http://www.gov.sgtjudiciary/subct/courts/mediation.html
17 The five main sources of Singapore law are: () legislation (including subsidiary legislation) passed
by the Singapore Parliament and its predecessors; (2) case law as decided by the Singapore courts and
its predecessor institutions; (3) the law of England as it stood on 27 November 1826; (4) imperial
statutes enacted when Singapore was part of the British Empire; and (5) English law made applicable
by virtue of the now repealed s 5 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43). A succinct treatment of the sources
of Singapore law can be found in Walter Woon's chapter on Singapore in Poh-Ling Tan (ed), Asian
Legal Systems: Law, Society and Pluralism in East Asia (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997), pp 335-341.
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application of prior existing law, which had served Singapore well.18 As a
common law legal system, the doctrine of binding precedent (stare decisis)
prescribes that judicial precedents must be followed in a prescribed manner.
However, the operation of stare decisis is complicated in Singapore as a result
of its constitutional history.19 The de facto binding nature of English judicial
decisions in Singapore has resulted in the 'impoverishment of the common law
in Singapore'. 2°
The Gordian knot of binding precedents was loosened with the
unprecedented Practice Statement on Judicial Precedent of 11 July 1994. It
declares that the advice of the Privy Council in London, its predecessor courts
and its own prior decisions no longer bind the Singapore Court of Appeal."
The Practice Statement reasons that:
The development of our law should reflect these changes [the political,
social and economic circumstances that have changed enormously since
Singapore's independence] and the fundamental values of Singapore society.
Yet the Practice Statement's applicability is limited to the Court of Appeal.
Bartholomew foresaw that English judicial decisions would be relegated to the
'deemed persuasive' category, which would be 'followed only to the extent to
which they command respect and are compatible with the social and economic
requirements' of Singapore.22
Indeed, compatibility with Singapore's social and economic requirements
would be the benchmark in a more selective use of foreign precedents and in
the development of Singapore's legal system. With the gradual development of
a Singapore jurisprudence, more local cases are being cited in arguments and
judgements.23 In tandem with the move to be more assertive in the development
of local jurisprudence, the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A), which
18 Philip N Pillai and Kevin Tan Yew Lee, 'Constitutional Development,' in Kemial Singh Sandhu and
Paul Wheatley (eds), Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p 653. Article 162 of the Constitution provides for the
continuation of all prior existing law which had effect as part of the law of Singapore immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution.
19 Woon (note 17 above), pp 339-341. At least twelve courts from British India, the Straits Settlements
and Malaysia can claim to be predecessors of the present Court of Appeal. Further, and more
interestingly, the decisions of English House of Lords were treated to all intents and purposes as being
binding in fact, if not in law.
20 See Andrew Phang, The Development of Singapore Law (note 7 above). Phang, at p 8 4, suggests that
there was a 'slavish adherence to English law'.
21 The Practice Statement can be found at [1994] 2 Singapore Law Reports 689.
22 G W Bartholomew, 'The Singapore Legal System,' in Kemial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley
(eds), Management of Success: The Moulding of Modem Singapore (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1989), p 642.
23 The first volumes of the Ha/sbury's Laws of Singapore (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1998) are now
available. A comprehensive treatment of the changes in the laws of Singapore and the legal system
between 1990 and 1995 can be found in Singapore Academy of Law, Review of Judicial and Legal
Reforms in Singapore between 1990 and 1995 (Singapore: Butterworths, 1996).
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came into force on 12 November 1993, seeks to delineate the extent to which
English law is applicable in Singapore. In many respects, Singapore's apron
strings to English law are slowly being cut although English law will continue
to be persuasive and followed, especially in the commercial realm. To ensure
that the legislative intents are attained, the judiciary is allowed to purposively
interpret legislation. The guideline, outlined in section 9A of the Interpretation
Act (Cap 1), is to adopt an interpretation that promotes the purpose or object
underlying the written law by looking at extrinsic material, inter alia, the
explanatory statement of the Bill and parliamentary record of debates. Given
the PAP's dominance of Parliament, this would facilitate the achievement of
the desired ends of the various legislation.
The community in the law
The primacy of cultural values
The manner in which the laws and the legal system evolve depends very much
on the role law is expected to serve in that society. The approach towards law
in Singapore has been greatly moulded by Cambridge-trained lawyer Lee Kuan
Yew, Singapore's Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990. A motivating Hobbesian
theme in Lee's thinking was that man is inherently bad. 4 Further, influenced
by neo-Confucian thinking on the role of government, Lee is of the view that
leaders have a moral duty to act in the collective interest and it is from this that
they derive their moral authority.25
The first priority of the PAP government on winning the 1959 elections was
to secure law and order in a Singapore stricken with latent communalism and
nascent communism. For Lee, the government's responsibility was to ensure
the individual's fundamental freedoms , not civil and political rights but rather
socio-cultural and economic rights. These included personal safety, opportunities
to obtain food and shelter, education and jobs. Only when the people's primary
needs were met could foreign investors be persuaded to invest. The 'Singapore
Way' is not only premised on the fact that Singapore society is organised
differently from the West but that the law has a different role too. In Western
societies, law serves to protect the individual from the state. By contrast, law
in Singapore tends to place relatively more importance on community interests.
Further, while the law does protect the individual, law is also mobilised to
24 Lee said in 1994 in New Zealand, that "[h]Juman beings, regrettable though it may be, are inherently
vicious and have to be restrained from their viciousness'. See Han Fook Kwang, Warren Fernandez
and Sumiko Tan, Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas (Singapore: Times Editions and The Straits
Times Press, 1998), p 194.
25 It is perhaps Lee's exposure to Western society as an undergraduate that convinced him that Western
values differed from the socio-cultural value system he came from, See, for instance, Lee Kuan Yew,
The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions and Straits Times Press,
1998), pp 129-130.
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enable the state to fulfil its development objectives. As Lee emphatically put
it:
26
The basic difference in our approach springs from our traditional Asian
value system, which places the interests of the community over and above
that of the individual, In English doctrine, the rights of the individual must
be the paramount consideration, we shook ourselves free from the confines
of English norms which did not accord with the customs and values of
Singapore society.
Indeed, this is one aspect of what is popularly known as the 'Asian Values'
debate that has attracted much controversy. 7 Lee's preference for a well-
ordered society is evident:2"
But as a total system [the American system], I find parts of it totally
unacceptable: guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behaviour
in public - in sum the total breakdown of civil society. The expansion of
the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come
at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-
ordered society so that everyone can have maximum enjoyment of his
freedoms. The freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural
state of contention and anarchy.
Lee maintains that cultural values of Asia are indispensable in the rise of
Asia and the recovery from the crisis. For Lee, good government is what people
want and this is premised on the primacy of economic development. To quote
Lee on his conception of good government:29
This depends on the values of a people. What Asians value may not
necessarily be what Americans or Europeans value. Westerners value the
freedoms and liberties of the individual. As an Asian of Chinese cultural
background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective and
efficient in protecting its people, and allowing opportunities for all to
26 Address by then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Opening of the Singapore Academy of Law,
(1990) 2 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 155.
27 For a penetrating analysis of human rights and 'Asian Values', see, generally, Joanne R Bauer and
Daniel A Bell (eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999); Wm Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian
Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Diane K Mauzy, The Human Rights
and "Asian Values" Debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to Clarify the Key Issues' (1997) The Pacific
Review 210; and Yuen Chung Kwong, 'Leninism, Asian Culture and Singapore' (1999) 27 Asian
Profile 217.
28 Fareed Zakaria, 'Culture is Destiny,' (interview with Lee Kuan Yew) (1994) 73(2) Foreign Affairs
109.
29 Han et al (note 24 above), p 380.
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advance themselves in a stable and orderly society, where they can live a
good life and raise their children to do better than themselves ... Very few
democratically elected governments in the Third World uphold these
values. But it is what their people want ... It is Asian values that have
enabled Singapore to contain its drug problem ...
In January 1999, Lee, however, stated that he had in his speeches all along
referred to 'Confucianist values' rather than 'Asian values'. Lee said, 'When
the West, especially Western journalists, use the term "Asian values", they
mean it as an antithesis to Western values. But there are actually many kinds
of Asian values'. He asserted that it was the non-observance of Confucianist
values that had aggravated the Asian crisis. Lee also stressed that an individual's
rights could not override society's rights, and this value, in his view, had not
changed despite the Asian economic crisis.3" On the diplomatic front,
Singapore's senior diplomats, Kishore Mahbubani and Bilahari Kausikan,
have been the most vocal proponents of 'Asian values'.31 For instance,
Kausikan argues that:32
... [Tihe key issue is not the difference between 'Asian' and 'Western'
values, let alone the superiority or inferiority of any one set of values to
another. It is not even what is distinctively or characteristically Asian about
any particular set of values. Today's 'Asian values' debate is basically about
Asian societies' future direction and development ... the question now
being asked ... is how to sustain development over the long term, bearing
in mind the pitfalls and dead ends that have confronted many more
developed (mainly Western) societies ... In debating 'Asian values,' they
are examining such issues as the responsibilities of individuals to society as
a whole, the role of family, the integrity of public institutions, and the
maintenance of law and order - issues that are also widely debated in the
West. Whatever the debate over 'Asian values' may be, then, it is not a clash
30 "Asian values"? I didn't use this term, says SM,' The Straits Times, 30 January 1999, p 6; 'Looking
to the Future,' Asiaweek, 21 May 1999, p 34.
31 See Kishore Mahbubani, 'The West and the Rest' (1992) 28 The National Interest 3; 'The Dangers
of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West' (1993) 72(4) Foreign Affairs 10. Both articles
are reproduced in Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians Think? (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998). See
also Bilahari Kausikan, 'An East Asian Approach to Human Rights' (1995-96) 2 Buffalo Journal of
International Law 263.
3 Bilahari Kausikan, 'The "Asian Values" Debate: A View from Singapore,' in Larry Diamond and
Marc F Plattner (eds), Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1998), pp 24-25. Cf Stephanie Lawson, 'Confucius in Singapore: Culture, Politics, and the PAP
State,' in Peter Dauvergne (ed), Weak and S&rong States in Asia-Pacific Societies (St Leonards, NSW:
Allen & Unwin in association with the Dept of International Relations, Research School of Pacific
and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1998); and Chua Beng Huat,' "Asian Values"
Discourse and the Resurrection of the Social' (1999) 7 Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique 573.
A commentator has referred to the values debate as a matter of'cultural-ideological predilection', see
Linda Y C Lim, 'Whose 'Model' Failed? Implications of the Asian Economic Crisis' (1998) 21(3) The
Washington Quarterly, 25.
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of civilisations ... The real debate is... about which values, in what degree
and in what proportions, are necessary for sustained development, the
maintenance of social cohesion, and the avoidance of serious problems...
The appropriate balance between different sets of values - between
individual rights that guarantee personal freedom, and social issues that
stem from the society's needs for stability and discipline - depends on the
particular circumstances of each society. The balance in each country will
therefore shift over time, and not only in one direction.
In effect, Lee's conception of good government stresses economic and
social rights rather than civil-political rights. This is similar to the position
taken by some Asian states at the Vienna human rights conference in 1993."3
Under this conception, society takes precedence over the individual. Ultimately,
whether Confucianist or Asian values is a viable alternative form of governance
is a non-issue since Confucianist values can be debased. What happened in
Asia was the abuse of state resources for personal and family gain.
This idea and belief of collective security, manifested in the community's
interests gaining precedence over the individual has been popularly characterised
in Singapore as 'communitarianism'.34 This communitarian ideology has since
been concretised as 'Shared Values'. Introduced in January 1993, they are
(1) Nation before community and society above self; (2) Family as the basic
unit of society; (3) Community support and respect for the individual; (4)
Consensus, not conflict; and (5) Racial and religious harmony.35 Originally
couched as a national ideology (not unlike Indonesia's Pancasila and Malaysia's
Rukunegara), it is meant as an axiom of faith by which Singaporeans of all races
and religious beliefs could subscribe to and live by.36 The drive towards nation-
building is increasingly evident. The corporatist principle of the Shared Values
is now supplemented by the 'Singapore 21 Vision', which calls for 'social
tripartism' in 'building a vision for the future ... to make Singapore our best
home'.37 Social tripartism - comprising the people, private and public sectors,
33 See James T H Tang (ed), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region (London:
Pinter, 1995).
4 For a useful primer on Western philosophical conception of communitarianism, see Stephen Mulhall
and Adam Swift, Liberals and Cornmunitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd ed, 1996).
35 White Paper on Shared Values (Cmnd 1 of 1991). However, the Shared Values lack constitutional
and legal standing.
36 The aim is 'to sculpt a Singaporean identity by incorporating the relevant parts of our various cultural
heritages as well as the attitudes and values which have helped us survive as a nation. It would also
help safeguard against undesirable values permeating from more developed countries which may be
detrimental to our social fabric', see Singapore's 'natiohal website', 'Singapore Infomap' at http://
www.sg/flavour/values-bg.html.
37 The components of the Singapore 21 Vision, which seeks to develop a 'Singapore leartbeat', are: (1)
Every Singaporean matters; (2) Strong Families: Our Foundation and Our Future; (3) Opportunities
for all; (4) The Singapore Heartbeat: Feeling passionately about Singapore and (5) Active citizens:
Making the difference. See Singapore 21: Together We Make the Difference (Singapore: Singapore 21
Committee, 1999).
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is a genus of Singapore's unique model of labour tripartism involving the trade
unions, employers and government.3
Law as social discipline
The need for social discipline within Singapore society has always been
emphasised by the Singapore leadership. The premise is that only with law and
order and a strong commitment to social discipline would foreign investors
invest in Singapore. Since attaining self-government in 1959, Singapore has
mobilised the legal system to instill social discipline. Labour legislation was one
of the first areas to receive the government's attention since Singapore needed
foreign investments for its economic take-off and to attain some degree of self-
sufficiency. This was aided by the close symbiotic relationship between the
PAP and the state-sponsored National Trade Union Congress (NTUC).39
These legal changes took place under the fledgling tripartite partnership of the
government, employers and employees, which reduced industrial actions to
being footnotes in Singapore's industrial history.' It is this symbiotic relationship
that has generated an admirable resolve in coping with the recent economic
downturn. 41 In November 1998, the government accepted the recommendation
of the National Wages Council (a tripartite body that advises the government
on wages) of a five to eight percent wage cut to top up the proposed ten
percentage point cut in employers' monthly Central Provident Fund
contributions (compulsory savings scheme). Taken together, these cuts slashed
wage costs by 15 percent and brought Singapore's labour costs relative to that
of other countries in the region to 1994 levels. This measure was regarded as
decisive in Singapore's vigorous recovery and achieving 5.6 percent growth for
1999.
Taking advantage of industrial peace and a pro-business environment since
1965, multinational corporations in diverse industries have established
themselves in Singapore. The prevalence of industrial peace and a well-
educated work force make Singapore attractive to foreign capital. It is this
combination of restrictive labour laws and the tripartite partnership -
38 'New model of partnership "can help fulfil Singapore 21 vision",' The Straits Times, 10 May 1999,
p3.
9 NTUC's Secretary-General is also a Minister of Cabinet-rank. Indeed, several Ministers of State and
PAP Members of Parliament are or were closely associated with the NTUC. See also People's Action
Party, 'For People through Action by Party' (Singapore: People's Action Party) pp 28-38.
40 On Singapore's unique tripartism an labour legislation, see, generally, Venkatraman Anantaraman,
Singapore Industrial Relations (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Management and McGraw-Hill,
1990); Chew Soon Beng, Trade Unionism in Singapore (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1991); and Tan
Chew Huat, Labour Management Relations in Singapore (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1995).
41 In 1998, the Singapore economy recorded a relatively low GDP growth rate of 1.5 percent; compared
with the average of 7.2 percent annual growth rate since 1980. In January 1998, Parliament passed
a motion affirming tripartism as a 'key competitive advantage of Singapore' and called on the
Government, employers and unions 'to further strengthen tripartite partnership in Singapore so as
to enhance Singapore's competitiveness'. See Parliamentary Debates Singapore Oicial Report, Vol 68,
no 2, cols 168-250 (15 January 1998).
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'enforceable benevolence' in the words of a scholar42 - that has enabled the
Singapore economy to be one of the most competitive in the world.
Criminal law: protection for society
'In criminal law legislation, our priority is the security and well being of law-
abiding citizens rather than the rights of the criminal to be protected from
incriminating evidence'." This probably best sums up the policy towards
criminal law legislation in Singapore. Singapore's criminal laws provide harsh
sanctions for persons convicted of certain offences such as vandalism, drug
trafficking and murder. Capital punishment and caning remain on the statute
books. Death by hanging is mandatory for murder, kidnapping, certain drug-
related offences and the unlawful possession and use of firearms. In addition, as
a public protection measure, the courts can order corrective training and
preventive detention.44
The clinical approach to societal scourges, like the drug menace, has
resulted in legislation that shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
accused. The Singapore courts have also not shied away from drawing adverse
inferences from an accused's silence in the face of damning evidence.45
Draconian as these various legislation and case law are, strong public disapproval
of such tough controls on criminal activity has been minimal. Neither is there
strong public disapproval of such tough controls on criminal activity.
Another legislation originating in the colonial era, the Criminal Law
(Temporary Provisions) Act (Cap 67) ('CLTPA'), provides for suspected
criminal elements to be detained without trial. Introduced in 1958, the
CLTPA was intended as a temporary measure. However, the continued
existence of the CLTPA in the statute books has been justified on the principle
of deterrence - their effectiveness in dealing with secret society and drug
offences. In these cases, it is argued that witnesses are afraid of testifying for the
prosecution for fear of reprisals. The government has further argued that secret
societies and drug-related activity still pose a threat.4 Hence, the recent
extension of the CLPTA for another five years to October 2004. Lee Kuan Yew
best encapsulates the utilitarian approach in criminal law in 1962:47
42 For a critique of the highly restrictive system of labour law from a rights perspective, see Anthony
Woodiwiss in Globalisation, Human Rights and Labour Law in Pacific Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
43 See note 24 above, p 155.
4' As Yong C said, 'Corrective training is imposed with a view to the reformation of the offender and
the prevention of crime, while preventive detention is imposed to protect the public': Yusoff bin
Hassan & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1992] 2 Singapore Law Reports 1032 at 1034E.
45 Section 196(2), Criminal Procedure Code applied in Oh Laye Koh v Public Prosecutor [19941 2
Singapore Law Reports 385.
46 Republic of Singapore Government Gazette Acts Supplement, No 18/1999, 14 May 1999; 'Criminal Law
Act extended for 5 more years,' The Straits Times, 16 April 1999, p 1.
47 See note 24 above, p 203.
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It must be realised that if you abolish the powers of arrest and detention and
insist on trial in open court in accordance with the strict laws of evidence
of a criminal trial, then law and order becomes without the slightest
exaggeration utterly impossible, because whilst you may still nominally
have law and order, the wherewithal to enforce it would have disappeared.
The choice in many of these cases is either to go through the motions of a
trial and let a guilty man off to continue his damage to society or to keep him
confined without trial.
Law and the individual: community first
It is evident that a far from universalistic stance is adopted in the approach to
law in areas where adherence to international norms is regarded as being less
critical in the functioning of a modem economy. Rather, an approach tending
towards a ready acceptance of cultural relativism and state-defined community-
based values becomes ascendant. The emphasis on duties (rather than rights)
and the priority of society's interests can be distilled on closer observation. 4s
The fundamental liberties provided in Part IV of Singapore's Constitution
do not differ much from those provided in Western liberal democracies. 49
Article 9 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
save in accordance with law. Slavery and forced labour are prohibited under
Article 10 while Article 11 offers protection against retrospective criminal laws
and repeated trials. Equality before the law and equal protection of the law are
found in Article 12. Article 13 provides for prohibition of banishment and
freedom of movement. Articles 12 and 15 guarantee the freedom of speech,
assembly, association and religion. Article 16 outlaws discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, descent or place of birth in the realm of education.
However, Part IV of the Constitution also contains various derogation
riders on the exercise of fundamental liberties. Indeed, the constitutional rights
where circumscribed are 'in accordance with law' and, inevitably, such
circumscription relate to the requirements of public order, public health,
morality and national security. The Internal Security Act (Cap 143) stands out
for mention. The Internal Security Act (ISA) provides for preventive detention
without trial for renewable two-year periods. A legacy of the Malayan Emergency
campaign against the communists, the ISA seeks to detain, under s 8, those'...
acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore ... or to the
48 Singapore has not signed the two principal conventions on human rights vi; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. See the human rights section of the United Nations' website at http://www.un.org/rights/,49 The best reference on fundamental liberties and constitutional law in Singapore and Malaysia is
Kevin Y L Tan and Thio Li-ann (eds), Tan, Yeo and Lee's Constituional law in Malaysia and Singapore
(Singapore: Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1997). For a study of Singapore's constitutional development in
the context of managing political change in a post-colonial society, see Kevin Y L Tan, The
Development of Constitutional Government in Singapore 1945-95, unpublished JSD thesis, Yale Law
School, 1996.
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maintenance of public order or essential services ... '. As a result of the
landmark case of Chng Suan Tze v The Minister of Home Affairs and Ors,5" the
government enacted immediate amendments to the ISA prospectively
overruling the decision in that case. Except for procedural matters, judicial
review is disallowed for any act done or decision made by the President or the
Home Affairs Minister under the ISA.5
In asserting the relevance of the ISA, the ISA and the Internal Security
Department (ISD) have been affirmed as the key components of Singapore's
national survival. Their continued existence is not in doubt. Indeed, while the
concern of communalism remains salient, the ISD is now highlighted for its
role in instilling in the population a sense of Singapore's tumultuous entry into
the world of sovereign states. At the ISD's fiftieth anniversary in 1998, the
Home Affairs Minister said:52
The history of ISD is obviously inextricably linked to our history of national
survival - of our overcoming the violent threats of communism,
communalism and Konfrontasi [conflict with Indonesia when Singapore was
part of Malaysia]. Out of this tumultuous history of our early nationhood, the
people and the Government forged a bond of trust and a shared commitment
to the values of communal peace and social and political stability ... The
National Education programme seeks to inform this generation of the
critical constraints and realities in which Singapore as a small, multi-racial
nation is embedded ... If need be, it must also renew in our young, the
patriotism and the instincts and reflexes necessary for Singapore's survival
in the context of these particular constraints and realities ... I commend
ISD for taking the strategic step of developing an outreach programme to
sensitise key Singaporean constituencies on fundamental security issues so
that they will not only understand them better but also come to realise that
the safe and secure Singapore they enjoy is something they all have a share
in achieving and a responsibility in sustaining...The outreach programme
that ISD has embarked on is not to seek popularity but should instead be an
attempt to develop new competencies, especially the ability to articulate its
position on security issues cogently and to inspire acceptance and co-operation.
In short, a nation-building role is now part of the raison d'etre of the ISD.
While the ISA and the CLTPA are used sparingly, their continued existence
50 [1989] 1 Malayan Law Journal 69.
51 See Act 2 of 1989, which introduced sections 8A-D to the ISA.
52 Speech by Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan Seng, ISD's 50th Anniversary Gala Dinner, 22
August 1998. Author's emphasis.
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and the effective non-availability of judicial review for ISA detentions present
the danger that they could be abused.53
Protection of minorties
Part of the Singapore's success story is her careful management of multi-ethnic
population, which has drawn praise internationally. 4 Singapore's multi-
ethnic population of 3.1 million comprises of 77.2 per cent ethnic Chinese, 14.
1 per cent Malays, 7.4 per cent Indians and 1.3 per cent Others.5 Article 152
of the Constitution provides for the Government's responsibility 'to care for
the interests of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore', in particular,
the 'special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore'.
The Government is constitutionally required to 'protect, safeguard, support,
foster and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and
cultural interests and the Malay language'. 6 In recognition of the special
position of the Malays as the indigenous people of Singapore, the Syariah
Court, which is constituted under the Administration of Muslim Law Act
(Cap 3), has jurisdiction in matters relating to Muslim personal law such as
marriages contracted under Islamic law.
Mindful of the dangers of communalism and religious extremism, there
exists statutory mechanisms for the preservation of ethnic peace. Part VII of the
Constitution provides for the establishment of the Presidential Council for
Minority Rights (PCMR). The PCMR's general function is to 'consider and
report on such matters affecting persons of any racial or religious community
in Singapore as may be referred to the Council by Parliament or the Government'.
The particular function of the PCMR is to draw attention to any Bill or
subsidiary legislation if it is a 'differentiating measure' - that is, the Bill or
subsidiary legislation discriminates against any racial or religious group. To
date, the PCMR has not issued any adverse report. Nevertheless, it would be
better if the shroud of secrecy that surrounds PCMR's proceedings could be
removed. Currently, the PCMR's proceedings are conducted in private. It is not
53 Kevin Y L Tan, 'Economic Development, Legal Reform, and Rights in Singapore and Taiwan,' in
Joanne R Bauer and Daniel A Bel[(eds), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 27 1. In 1998,4 and 450 persons were detained under the ISA
and CLTPA respectively: see Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, Vol 69, no 12, cols 1989.
1992 (20 January 1999).
54 On Singapore's racial policy, see R K Vasil, Asianising Singapore: The PAP's Management of Ethnicity
(Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1995); David Brown, 'Ethnicity and Corporation in Singapore', The
State and Ethnic Politics in South-East Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) and Nirmala S
PuruShotam, Negotiating Language, Constructing Race: Disciplining Race in Singapore (Berlin and New
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1998).
5 The figures are for 1997 and obtained from the web-site of Department of Statistics, Ministry of Trade
and Industry at http://www.singstat.gov.sg. The racial classification 'Others' refers to Eumsians and
other non-Malay and non-Indian minorities like the Jews and Parsees.
56 For a critique of the govemment policies towards the Malays, see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, The Singapore
Dilemma: The Political and Educational Marginality of the Malay Community (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
Vol130 Part I
entitled to hear objectors or examine witnesses. Further, members of the
PCMR are or were members of the establishment.57
The aim of entrenching multi-racial representation in Parliament is put
forth as the basis for the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) concept
in the Parliamentary Elections Act (Cap 218). The GRC concept requires
three to six constituencies to be contested as a group. Candidates from a single
party are fielded as a slate but at least one candidate must be a member of a racial
minority. The team that polls the highest number of votes carries all the seats
in that GRC. According to the Government, the GRC concept is to ensure
that the minority groups will have adequate representation in Parliament."8
Noticing the worldwide trend of religion entering the political arena, the
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap 167A) was enacted to draw a
clear demarcation between the religious and secular worlds and to prevent
religion from being manipulated for political motives.
There is still much room for improvement in ethnic relations in Singapore.
Prime Minister Gob Chok Tong has acknowledged that Singapore is not yet
a nation.59 It remains to be seen how the current effort to create 'the Singapore
tribe' can be reconciled with the leadership's belief that race and religion are
stronger ethnic markers than a putative national identity. The development of
a truly Singaporean national identity has been hampered, in part, by Singapore's
geopolitical position in a Malayo-Muslim world and the complicated history of
Singapore's ties with Malaysia.6"
Defamation of public figures
Defamation suits taken out by the Singapore Cabinet Ministers in their
personal capacities against opposition political leaders draw the most public
international attention to the Singapore style of government and the use of the
legal process in the practice of politics. Criticisms levelled by international
human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists are 'directed not so much at Singapore's legal system per
se as against the PAP government's use - and alleged misuse - of the court
57 For critiques of the PCMR, see Thio So Mien, 'The Presidential Council,' (1969) 1 Singapore Law
Review 2; David Marshall, 'The Presidential Council,' (1969) 1 Singapore Law Review 9; This Li-
ann, The Constitutional Framework of Powers,' in Kevin Y L Tan (ed), The Singapore Legal System
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2nd ed, 1998), pp 101-2.
58 With most parliamentary seats now being GRC-seats, the GRC concept has been criticised as
gerrymandering, see Christopher Tremewan, 'Parliament, Elections and Parties,' in The Political
Economy of Social Control in Singapore (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994). See also Rahim (note 56
above, pp 77-9.
59 'PM: S'pore is not a nation yet,' The Straits Times, 6 May 1999, pp 1, 28-9.
60 See Lee Kuan Yew's controversial observations on the Malaysian Malay quest for ethnic dominance
when Singapore was part of Malaysia from 1963-65; Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of
Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions and The Straits Times Press, 1998). Indeed, the colour
imagery employed by then Indonesian President Habibie when he described Singapore as 'a tiny red
dot in a sea of green' is not lost on the Singapore leadership.
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process'. 6' In this connection, the courts are placed in an unenviable position
of having to strike a delicate balance between the constitutional right of free
speech and protecting the reputations and integrity of Singapore's leaders. This
is another example of the subtle tension and dilemma of achieving constitutional
protection afforded to individuals and the need to protect the larger interests
of the community.
In this instance, the need to maintain the integrity of the system and the
leaders triumphs over the individual's freedom of expression. In some Western
liberal democracies, public figures are expected to tolerate a higher level of
scrutiny, criticism and comment that would otherwise be defamatory in normal
circumstances. However, such is not the case in Singapore where the government
has argued that it is the integrity of Singapore's political system that is at stake.
Further, it has been argued that a relaxation of the defamation law governing
public figures would create difficulty in attracting the best people to serve in the
political leadership. Prime Minister Goh testified in the defamation suit against
opposition politician J B Jeyaratnam that:
62
We are a different society. In Singapore, we believe that leaders must be
honourable men, gentlemen or junzl (a Confucian gentleman), and if our
integrity is attacked, we defend it ... If leaders and politicians do not defend
their integrity, they are finished ... So, each time our integrity is impugned,
we come out strongly and go to the courts to defend it. If you do not do that,
over time, politics in Singapore is going to degenerate into politics like some
other countries where leaders are called liars and cheats and nothing is done.
The courts have been inclined to accept such an argument and accord a
heavier weight to the collective interests. In Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew,
Judge of Appeal L P Thean said that politicians:"
... do not forfeit the protection of their reputations merely because they
have entered the political arena and assumed high offices. Freedom of
expression is perfectly legitimate so long as it does not encroach upon the
realm of defamation.
As Kevin Tan notes:
In public law, human rights groups feel the courts have been overly
deferential to the Executive. By deferential I do not mean they are biased,
61 See 'Is Singapore's legal system getting a bad name?,' The Straits Times, 25 October 1997.
62 Quoted in ibid. The case is reported as Goi Chok Tong v Jeyareenam Joshua Benjamin [1998] 3
Singapore Law Reports 337 (CA); [1998] 1 Singapore Law Reports 547 (HC).
63 [199811 Singapore Law Reports 97 at p 139.
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or compliant, but that, between two possible choices, greater benefit of the
doubt is given to the Executive than to the individual or any other group.
There is a generally conservative approach to adjudication.6
This statist image of law is congruent with a corporatist conception of state
and society. Within this paradigm, the dominance of state interests and
objectives flows from the state and society being viewed as an organic entity
with state-interpreted community interests having primacy.
Managing civil society
The management of the non-governmental sector of society also sees the
guiding hand of the law. This segment of society has been termed by the
government as 'the people sector' (as opposed to 'civil society'). The people
sector is envisaged as part of the corporatist set-up and practising a consensual
form of dialogue with the state. As of 1 April 1998, there were 5,208 registered
societies in Singapore.6 5 However, while the large number of societies in
Singapore seems to suggest a thriving civil society, the constitutional rights of
freedom of association and of assembly are subjected to the requirements of
public peace, welfare or good order. 'Societies' under the Societies Act (Cap
311) encompasses the gamut of non-governmental organisations and quasi-
governmental organisations including school alumni, political parties, special
interest groups and residents' associations. The Societies Act prescribes the
need for registration otherwise the society will be illegal. A society will not be
registered if it is contrary to national interest. There are penalties ranging from
imprisonment to fines for organisers and members of an illegal society as well
as for allowing the premises to be used for the unlawful assembly. Furthermore,
a society, unless it is a registered political party, is proscribed from engaging in
politics.
While there is a growing community involvement with the growth of many
civic organisations and non-governmental organisations, the developments
suggest an expanding 'civic' society, which should not be equated with a 'civil'
society as is commonly understood. Whether this civic consciousness translates
to a more participatory style of politics is in doubt. Civil society - understood
here as an engine or agent of political democratization - is a misnomer in
Singapore given the dominance of the PAP and the depoliticisation of the
Singapore polity. Indeed, Lam asserts that relatively high-profile groups within
64 Quoted in note 61 above. See also Thio Li-ann, 'An"i" for an "I"? Singapore's Communitarian Model
of Constitutional Adjudication' (1997) 27 Hong Kong Law Journal 152.65 Supplement to Government Gazette, No 10f98, 17 July 1998.
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the nascent civil society are but 'peripheral and exist only at the sufferance of
the state'.66
Indeed, civil society is not about contending voices that go against the grain
of consensus so valued in Singapore. It ought to be viewed as providing an extra-
judicial check against weakness in governance and the abuse of power. It is well
and good that Singapore has had good men to lead and build institutions, which
have engendered a culture of good governance. But the uncertainty that good
men will continue to lead Singapore has been one of the rationale behind the
institution of the elected President: that of safeguarding Singapore's substantial
financial reserves and key institutions such as the civil service in the face of a
less than forthright government.67
A vibrant civil society through the participation of the citizenry will help
strengthen the political fabric and the emotional ties that Singaporeans have
towards Singapore. A genuine sense of belonging would engender 'emotional
stakeholding' of the citizenry towards Singapore. A vibrant civil society would
also buttress good governance in the Singapore polity. Civil society can help
ensure that laws, public institutions and sound values are safeguarded -
through an emphasis on the substance rather than form of law - beyond the
veil of legalism.
Universalism of Singapore's commercial laws
By contrast, a study of Singapore's economic policy and legal framework will
highlight the salience of laws and the legal system in creating an economic
environment that is universal, incorporating international law, facilitating
business operations in Singapore. Singapore has consistently been ranked as
one of the freest economies in the world.68 To this end, the government has
spared no effort in building an efficient and effective legal system complemented
by innovative legislation and stringent enforcement. Since the early 1990s,
the court system underwent radical changes that shortened the period between
the filing of the suit and its resolution such that even lawyers had difficulty
coping.69 To expedite the resolution of cases before the courts, greater use is
Lam Peng Er, 'Singapore. Rich State, Illiberal Regime,' in James W Morley (ed), Driven b) Growth:
Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, revised ed,
1999), pp 272-3. A recent discussion of civil society in Singapore is Chua Beng Huat's 'State and
Society: Ambling Towards Greater Balance,' in Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao Yuan (eds),
Singapore: Re-Engineering Success (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1998).
67 For a multi-disciplinary treatment of the institution of the elected President, see Kevin Y L Tan and
Lam Peng Er (eds), Managing Political Change in Singapore: The Elected President (London and New
York: Routledge, 1997).
68 The survey is the Economic Freedom of the World, 1998-1999 (Interim Report), see 'Singapore second
freest economy,' The Straits Times, 6 November 1998, p 3. In fact, the World Competitiveness
Yearbook, Global Competitiveness Report and the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy have
consistently rated the competitiveness of Singapore's economy to be among the best.
69 'Courts moving "too fast" for lawyers,' The Straits Times, 11 May 1999, pp 2, 34-5. For further
information on judicial reforms, see Supreme Court Singapore: The Re-Organisation of the 1990s
(Singapore: Supreme Court of Singapore, 1994).
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made of information technology. Documents for use in legal proceedings can
be filed with the courts' registries electronically.
A very recent innovation is the forthcoming establishment of the Commercial
Criminal and Civil (District) Courts in anticipation of increasingly complex
criminal and civil actions which would come to the Singapore courts for
adjudication as Singapore seeks to be a key player in the global market. 7
Furthermore, legislation is now before Parliament to allow joint ventures and
alliances between Singapore and offshore law firms to further strengthen the
legal infrastructure as Singapore seeks to be a regional business and financial
hub.
Given the hegemonic control of the ruling party in Parliament, it is
imperative that any challenge to the judiciary's lack of independence is
defended resolutely by the government. During the Parliamentary debate on
the independence and integrity of Singapore's judiciary in 1995, Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew said:7'
But when the Government, including me, takes a matter to court or when
the Government is taken by private individuals to court, then the court
must adjudicate upon the issues strictly on their merits and in accordance
with the law. To have it otherwise is to lose ... our standing and ... our status
as an investment and financial centre. The interpretation of documents, of
contracts in accordance with the law is crucial. Our reputation for the rule
of law has been and is a valuable economic asset, part of our capital, although
an intangible one. It has brought to Singapore good returns from the MNCs,
OHQs, the banks, the financial institutions, and the flood of capital to buy
up properties in Singapore.
In the various surveys cited, Singapore scored well in areas of the legal
system assessment such as legal enforcement of commercial contracts, availability
of alternative modes of dispute resolution and the efficiency of the courts and
law enforcement. However, Singapore did not rank as well when it came to the
intangibles like 'impartiality of arbitration' and 'justice'.72
Corrupton
The Asian economic crisis, with its attendant socio-political ills, has driven
home the importance of preventing corruption. In Singapore, the anti-
corruption drive is designed to 'minimise or remove the conditions of
both incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt behaviour
70 See Chief Justice's Response at the 0pening of the Legal Year 2000, available at http://www.supcourt.
gov.sg/announcementsspeeches/ind ex.html
71 Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report, Vol 65, no 2, col 236 (2 November 1995).
72 See 'Is Singapore's legal system getting a bad name?' The Straits Times, 25 October 1997.
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irresistible'. 3 A nearly corruptionfree Singapore helps promote Singapore as
a good place for trade and investment, It also ensures that everyone is treated
equally in various aspects of life. The legal disincentives are the tough
legislation and enforcement mechanisms wherein there is zero tolerance for
corruption.
The centrepieces of the anti-corruption infrastructure are the Prevention of
Corruption Act (Cap 241), the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act
(Cap 15A) and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). Established
in 1952, the CPIB is an independent body which investigates and aims to
prevent corruption in the public and private sectors in Singapore. The CPIB
Director reports directly to the Prime Minister. Besides bringing corruption
offenders to book, the CPIB carries out corruption prevention by reviewing the
work methods and procedures of corruption-prone departments and public
bodies. It tries to identify administrative weaknesses in the existing systems,
which could facilitate corruption and malpractice and recommends remedial
and preventive measures to the heads of departments concerned. The CPIB
also regularly conducts lectures and seminars to educate public officers,
especially those who come into contact with the public, on the pitfalls and
avoidance of corruption. The powers of the CPIB provided under the Prevention
of Corruption Act are extensive and include the power to investigate and
examine bank accounts and assets of officials under investigation.
In order to attract the best to the civil service and the political leadership
and to prevent corruption, senior civil servants and Ministers are among the
best paid in the world. 74 The challenge is to continue to remain alert to
corruption of a non-pecuniary nature, which some scholars have labelled as
'particularistic privileges' that would undermine this cornerstone of Singapore's
hard-earned success and prosperity. 75
Law, safe and open business Environment and the knowledge-based economy
The role of law in creating a conducive environment for economic activity is
demonstrated most vividly in the creation of statutory bodies that spearhead
Singapore's trade, investment and economic policies viz the Economic
?3 JonS T Quah 'Sinpore'- s Model ofDevelopment: Is it Transferable?' in Henry S Rowen (ed), Behind
East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity (London and New York:
Routledge, 1998), p 109. See also Tan Ah Leak, 'The Experience of Singapore in Combating
Corruption,' in Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J Kpundeh (eds), Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for
Building National Integrity (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999); and Jon S T Quah, 'Corruption in
Asian Countries: Can it be Minimized?' (1999) 59 Public Administration Review 483.
74 The reasoning behind the 'competitive salaries' for civil servants and Cabinet Ministers can be found
in the White Paper on Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government (Crnd 13 of 1994).
75 Corrupt practices take a variety of forms and go beyond the conventional understanding of pecuniary
benefit to embrace the gain of privilege. See Paul Hutchcroft, 'The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the
Impact of Rents, Corruption and Clientelism on Third World Development' (1997) 45 Political
Studies 639. See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Governnent: Causes, Consequences, and
Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Development Board (EDB) and the Trade Development Board (TDB).76
Singapore has demonstrated legal innovation in marrying law, the administrative
framework and the demands of an open economy. 77 International conventions
are increasingly incorporated into local legislation. For instance, the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (Cap 33) has incorporated the Hague-Visby shipping
rules. Likewise, the convention on international sales of goods has been
enacted locally through the Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) (Cap
283A). This harmonisation with international conventions and model laws is
likely to become more prevalent. Singapore has also acceded to international
treaties governing shipping, civil aviation and telecommunications that 'allow
for international influence and uniformity as regards these linkages between
Singapore's economy and the world'.78
The present thrust in Singapore's development plans is to build a 'knowledge-
based economy'. The need to value add the goods and services of Singapore
origin is necessitated by the lack of natural resources and the inability to
compete with its neighbours on production costs. Indeed, Singapore's best
economic option appears to be in the realm of high technology and information
technology. Hence, the need for sound protection of intellectual property gains
increased importance. Besides common law remedies, Singapore has a
comprehensive statutory regime for the intellectual property rights that
endeavours to adopt the prevailing international practice. The Patents Act
(Cap 225), which came into effect on 23 February 1995, replaced the old system
of registration in which there was a need to obtain a British patent or an
European patent designating Great Britain before patent protection could be
obtained in Singapore. Under the 1995 Act, original filing of patent applications
in Singapore is sufficient. The Copyright Act (Cap 63) and Trade Marks Act
(Cap 332) are also updated regularly to give effect to international conventions
to which Singapore is a signatory and also to ensure that the laws are not an
unnecessary hindrance to cutting edge research and technology.
To further develop Singapore's position as an IT and knowledge hub and to
capture the growing market in electronic commerce (e-commerce), there is a
legislative platform that is continuously updated to keep pace with anticipated
technological changes and international norms. These legislation include the
recently enacted Electronic Transactions Act 1998 (Cap 88) and the recently
amended Computer Misuse Act (Cap 50A). Even the century old Evidence
Act (Cap 97) is updated to ensure that evidence in cyberspace is admissible in
court proceedings. Together with a strong enforcement mechanism, the
76 The relevant statutes are the Economic Development Board Act (Cap 85) and the Trade Development
Board Act (Cap 330).
7 The pioneering study in this area, although now dated, is Philip N Pillai's State Enterprise in Singapore:
Legal Importation and Development (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983).
78 Tay (note 2 above), p 484. A useful appendix on Singapore's accession to significant international
treaties can be found at pp 496-506.
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legislative framework is well equipped to ensure that 'responsible "Netizens"
can operate in relative security'.79
In order to promote Singapore as a total business centre, the government has
provided the facilities for alternative dispute resolution for commercial matters.
As mentioned earlier, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) viz mediation,
arbitration and negotiation is strongly encouraged as a quicker, more affordable
and effective form of dispute resolution. Parties in a legal suit are always
encouraged to attempt out of court settlements. Effectiveness comes in that
parties are more likely to maintain their relationships, business or otherwise,
through a more consensual form of dispute resolution. Under the International
Arbitration Act (Cap 143A), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre
(SIAC) is the statutory appointing authority to oversee international arbitration
in Singapore.sc A Singapore arbitral award is easily enforceable internationally
across over 100 states, including the United Kingdom and the United States.
Singapore has acceded to the UN Convention on The Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.
Media and the paradox of expanding markets
Information is vital in the commercial realm and the management of the mass
media in Singapore demonstrates the constant tensions between the need for
information in an open economy and the freedom of speech. In 1998, there
were 203 accredited correspondents from 73 international news agencies,
newspapers and broadcast agencies in Singapore."' Taking advantage of the
financial, information and printing hub that Singapore offers, many international
newspapers and magazines are published or printed there for the Asia-Pacific
region.
To balance the need of business and commerce for access to information
with the need to ensure that information on Singapore is portrayed accurately,
Singapore has instituted legislation to ensure that the government has a 'right
of reply' where there are inaccuracies. For instance, under the Newspaper and
Printing Presses Act (Cap 206), in order to obtain a permit to import, sell and/
or distribute an offshore newspaper in Singapore, the proprietor of an offshore
newspaper is required to furnish a cash deposit or bankers' guarantee of
S$200,000. This ensures compliance with the requirement that the permit
holder (proprietor) 'irrevocably recognises that the Singapore courts have
jurisdiction over all disputes which may arise out of or in connection with any
7 Keynote address by Professor S Jayakumar, Singapore's Minister of Law, Opening of the International
Crime and Technology Conference in Singapore, 14 October 1998; available at http://www.gov.sg/
mita/pressrelease/981014 0 1.htm
80 Information on the SIAC can be obtained from its website, http://siac.tdb.gov.sgl.
8' Singapore Facts and Pictures 1999 (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999), p 200.
a' See s 16 of the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Cap 206).
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matter contained in the newspaper. It also gives Singapore courts jurisdiction
in such disputes.8
For the Singapore government, the premise is that it must be allowed to state
its side of the story and respond to inaccuracies and misinformation. Such a
requirement might appear stringent and might encourage self-censorship but
it has not prevented foreign media organisations from using Singapore as a base
for their regional reporting.83
British legacy in Hong Kong SAR: Tongchuan yimeng (Same bed,
different dreams)?
The people of Hong Kong should never be confused over how to safeguard
their own interests. They will hear many voices cheering them on to fight
China for more democracy... From 1 July 1997, Hong Kong's destiny is tied
to China's. Hong Kong is a part of China and must share China's destiny...
If Hong Kong fails, China will suffer; if China succeeds, Hong Kong will
succeed ... Fifty years is not a long time in the history of people, and it does
not make sense in the next 50 years to keep Hong Kong as separate and
distinct from the mainland as possible. There is no future in that.84
British rule in Hong Kong had endowed her with a reasonably efficient legal
system, civil service, administrative framework and a laissez-faire economic
system that endeared it to the international capitalist world. 5 The development
of Hong Kong SAR would be an interesting case in examining how a different
value and legal system would influence its course of governance and development.
Questions have been raised about the future of the British legacy since the
return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty on 1 July 1997.86 Values, attitudes
and culture differ and the handover negotiations demonstrated the stark
differences in issues such as rule of law and democracy. Despite Beijing's
commitment to the 'one country, two systems' policy until 2047, it should be
remembered that the Chinese way of governance is the antithesis of the British
8 For the argument that the media's expanding markets can be a force for self-censorship within East
Asia, see Garry Rodan, 'Asia and the International Press: The Political Significance of Expanding
Markets,' in Vicky Randall (ed), DemocratiZation and the Media (London and Portland, OR: Frank
Cass, 1998). For critiques on the control of the media in Singapore, see Francis T Scow, The Media
Enthralled: Singapore Redsited (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998) and Garry Rodan, 'The Internet
and Political Control in Singapore' (1998) 113 Political Science Quarterly 63.
84 Speech by Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Pacific Rim Forum, Hong Kong, 27 June
1997. The speech is available at the Singapore Ministry of Information and the Arts website, http:f
/www.gov.sg/mita/pressrelease/97062802.htm.
85 A self-congratulatory account of Britain's management of colonial Hong Kong is Robin McLaren,
Britain's Record in HongKong (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
86 There are many 'doomsday' accounts of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty. See, for
example, Alvin Rabushka, Freedom's Fall in Hong Kong (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peace, 1997) and Stephen Vines, Hong Kong: China's New Colony (London: Aurum
Press, 1998). A more balanced assessment is Wang Gungwu and John Wong (eds), Hong Kong in
China: The Challenges of Transition (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1999).
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and that 'two systems' cannot mean countervailing systems. Lucien Pye
commented that: s7
The erratic behaviour of the Chinese state in both domestic and international
affairs is exacerbated by the Chinese belief that benevolent government
requires rule by men and not by law. (The Chinese tradition of rule by law
was one of arbitrary and harsh authoritarianism.) The Confucian ideal of
rule by superior men acquired a new vigour when China adopted Leninist
tlitism, and the Confucian-Leninist hybrid produced a system that gives
successive top rulers extraordinary freedom. Consequently, and paradoxically,
ultimate power in a society that is otherwise group oriented rests largely in
the hands of individual personalities.
Barring any drastic regime change in China, the tentative indications are
that the legal and political system will increasingly be brought within Beijing's
sphere of influence where individual rights are concerned. Similar to Singapore,
there is likely to be a dichotomy in Hong Kong SAR's approach towards
commercial law and the law relating to personal liberty and civil society. As a
'special administrative region', and not autonomous region, one should not
expect too much latitude and autonomy where the political system is concerned;
its political development cannot be contradictory to the prevailing norms in
China. Hong Kong SAR cannot be the bastion for the anti-China establishment.
Like Singapore, universalism is likely to be the attitude adopted with regards
to Hong Kong SAR's economic system. The focus is to ensure its continuing
prosperity and as a viable conduit for investments flowing into China, especially
the coastal and southern areas. Hong Kong SAR can function in this regard as
a positive agent of change vis-a-vis China in the economic realm. Indeed, the
law has played a crucial role in the economic reforms since Deng Xiaoping
revolutionized Chinese society recovering from the aftermath of Mao's misguided
Cultural Revolution.88
However, such a catalytic role is not envisaged in the political arena,
especially where individual rights and freedoms are concerned. Cultural
relativism and communitarian-based understanding of rights and obligations
would predominate. This is buttressed by the persistent and abiding fear of
instability and disorder ('luan') and a heightened sensitivity to any perceived
undermining of Chinese sovereignty and foreign interference. The resurgence
87 Lucian W Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, New edition,
1992),p 251. For a recent comprehensive overview of Chinese law, see Chen Jianfu, Chinese Law:
Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, its Nature and Development (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1999), especially pp 355-363.88 For a discussion on the role of law in supporting economic reforms under the Open Door' policy in
PRC from 1978-1995, see Katharina Pistor and A Philip Wellons, The Role of Law and Legal
Institutions in Asian Economic Development: 1960-1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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of Confucianism, Chinese civilizational discourse (by implication, anti-
westernisation) and Chinese nationalism are likely to lead Beijing to ensure
that the socio-political discourse in Hong Kong will not be anathema to the
mainland.89 In this regard, an autochthonous politico-legal system in the Hong
Kong SAR is in the making, which will modify British-inspired institutions and
values. This development is in a constant state of flux but the embedding of law,
values and culture - as understood and defined by Beijing - will be an
inevitable consequence. Concerns that the Hong Kong SAR model will
wholly converge with that of mainland China is probably unwarranted as the
former will be the template for any future attempt at China's and Taiwan's
reunification." For a liberal but undemocratic British Crown colony,
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s in Hong Kong was accompanied by the
belief that the rule of law could counter the patronizing traditionalism of a post-
Leninist China.9 These changes, accelerated by the Tiananmen Incident and
the arrival of the last British Governor Christopher Patten, precipitated a
whole set of legal and political changes.2 Since July 1997, amendments to
various Ordinances like the Bills of Rights, Societies, Public Order and
Personal Data Privacy are indicative that Beijing is not prepared for the status
quo where its political fundamentals are perceived to be threatened. Much as
Hong Kong SAR is the economic jewel and test case for cross-Straits
reunification, China will not tolerate the undermining of her sovereignty,
Indeed, sovereignty, order and national security - widely interpreted by the
state - have primacy over prosperity. Ultimately, one China is more imperative
than two systems.
Hong Kong's sterling economic performance under British rule as well as
China's own economic performance will provide comfort to the Beijing
authorities that democratic institutions are not necessary for rapid economic
8 A recent discussion on the revival of Chinese nationalism incorporating Chinese civilizational pride
and Confucianism is Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization,
Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Lecture
entitled, 'Chinese Culture and Politics' by George Yeo, Minister For Trade & Industry, Singapore,
at the Golden Jubilee Anniversary of New Asia College, Hong Kong, 29 October 1999. Text of
speech available at http://www.gov.sg/mitalpressrelease/99102902.htm.
90 See, for instance, Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge (London and New York: Routledge,
1996).
91 Carol Jones argues that the 'attachment' to the rule of law has relatively recent origins in Hong Kong,
beginning in the 1970s: 'Politics postponed: law as a substitute for politics in Hong Kong and China,
'in Kanishka Jayasuriya (ed), Law, Cauitalism and Power in Asia: The Rule of Law andLegal institutions
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
92 The literature on political developments in Hong Kong since the signing of the Joint Declaration is
voluminous, See, for example, Ian Scott (ed), Institutional Change and the Political Transition in Hong
Kong (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998); Chris Patten, East and West: The Last Governor of Hong
Kong on Power, Freedom and the Future (London: Macmillan, 1998), Judith M Brown and Rosemary
Foot, eds, Hong Kong's Transitions, 1842-1997 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997).
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growth. 3 As Lynn White III succinctly describes the challenge posed to Hong
Kong's legal system and political masters:94
Tycoons and democrats alike will need a stable rule of law in Hong Kong's
future. They may hope that Hong Kong's judicial system will not become
merely a part of the executive, as is still the national norm. Reformers in
Beijing may nonetheless raise confidence that laws can become more
impartial, both in Hong Kong and in China. If they fail to do so, the habit
of trying to substitute personal relationships for reliable laws may reach its
limits. Both are needed, as the linked economies of the PRC and Hong Kong
expand further.
The right of abode and the flag desecration cases have been cited as being
indicative of the trend towards the clipping of the wings of the Hong Kong
SAR's judiciary.9" Although some of the concerns are valid, the jury is still out
on the future of Hong Kong's way of life. The political matrix in China is still
in a state of flux and predicting is hazardous. However, if developments in Hong
Kong SAR are not perceived to compromise stability and order to the larger
Chinese polity, then it is likely that the Hong Kong way of life would prevail,
albeit with the likelihood of some influence from China. The vibrant democracy
movement and international opinion would help ensure that Beijing factors in
Hong Kong's socio-political matrix before making any drastic changes to the
Hong Kong way of life. China has signed (although not ratified) the international
covenants on civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural
rights and has agreed to file annual reports on the human rights situation in
Hong Kong. It is likely that a convergence along Beijing terms would be
encouraged in the socio-political arena, while simultaneously absorbing Hong
Kong SAR's economic norms. Beijing would also be mindful of the need for
Hong Kong SAR's key institutions to maintain their legitimacy. These
institutions will also assist in ensuring Hong Kong's identity as a SAR (not as
a colony) and Hong Kong people as citizens of the PRC. This is a sine qua non
if society's centrifugal forces are to be kept in check. In the final analysis,
93 Cf Pranab Bardhan, 'Democracy and Development: A Complex Relationship,' in Ian Shapiro and
Casiano Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
9' Lynn White Il, Forward: 'One Country as a Changed System,' in Ming K Chan (ed), The Challenge
of Hong Kong's Reintegration with China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), p xii. Alvin
So in his Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999) argues that Hong Kong under China's rule would resemble the limited
democracy Hong Kong experienced in the 1980s. Then the business class in Hong Kong, in alliance
with the Chinese government, slowed down the headlong rush towards democratization before the
handover. Indeed, the business-government linkages would be a development worth closer study.95 See Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 January 2000, p 25; 30 December 1999, p 91; 23 December
1999, p 18; 16 December 1999, pp 16-18. For a case comment on the right of abode case, see Bing
Ling, 'Can Hong Kong courts review and nullify acts of the National People's Congress?' (1999) 29
Hong Kong Law Journal 8.
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legitimacy and 'political credibility', measured by predictability and stability of
political regimes, rather than high degrees of political democracy would be of
greater importance in the continued prosperity of any polity.'
Concluding remarks
Compatible with international norms, the legal framework in Singapore
provides adequate protection and inspires confidence within the international
trading and investing community. Singapore will maintain and enhance its
efficient legal system and laws.97 Given Singapore's heavy reliance on foreign
trade and investments, the need to provide a conducive environment for such
economic activities is imperative. Law is therefore regarded as a fundamental
economic value and capital that should be harnessed.
In the domain of legal protection for individuals, the legal regime in
Singapore provides sufficient protection although certain pieces of legislation
sit oddly with the highbrow protection enshrined in the Constitution.
Singapore's muki-ethnic composition and the overriding importance of law
and order supplemented by the PAP government's success in generating
economic wealth have legitimated the state's preference for tough laws as part
and parcel of good governance. In this sense, the adherence to and heavy
reliance on law is also a political value that is greatly resorted to in instilling the
value of good governance and the cultivation of social discipline.
The thrust of Singapore's approach to law and the legal system can be
characterised as 'law as development'. Harding observes that 'law has been seen
primarily as an instrument of social engineering rather than an expression of a
particular balance of principles defined politically or culturally and regarded as
an embodiment of justice'.9 To entrench the rule of law, notwithstanding that
instrumentalism has been effectively mobilised in building a viable state that
is economically prosperous, the natural progression is to achieve the
amalgamation of law as development and law as the embodiment of justice.
The universal legal norms in the commercial realm co-exist with the
particularistic legal standards in the non-commercial realm. This tension is
evident when a foreigner living or working in Singapore gets entangled in a
criminal case. The norms a foreigner is used to are often in conflict with the
standards here. While cultural relativism - and with it the value system of
96 This is the thesis in Silvio Borner, Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder, Political Credibility and
Economic Development (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995).
97 See Supreme Court Singapore: Excellence into the Next Millennium (Singapore: Supreme Court of
Singapore, 1999).
98 Andrew Harding, 'The Singapore Model of Law and Development and Its Clonability: "Smart" Laws
in the Intelligent Island,' Paper presented at the Conference on Law and Development in East and
Southeast Asia, organised by the International Institute of Asian Studies, Leiden, 29-30 January
1998.
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Singapore society - is likely to be called upon to legitimise the law as
development approach in Singapore, the challenge remains for Singapore
jurisprudence to marry the twin concerns of development and justice. As
Singaporean society matures, the twin needs for law as development and law
as justice become critical in ensuring that the political and legal systems
continue to maintain and enhance their legitimacy. To some extent, the same
can be said for the Hong Kong SAR.
Laws govern almost every aspect of a Singaporean's life from birth to death.
In the commercial realm, with the dictates of global realities, the
internationalisation of law has prevailed. The careful balance of rights and
obligations found in the commercial laws is not replicated fully in laws relating
to individual freedom and civil society. Here the fundamental concerns of law
and order, public morality and national security are foremost. In this scheme
of things, the 'junzi' (Confucian gentleman) and 'li' (proper behaviour in
sync with societal order and, norms through moral propriety) are dominant
themes. 9 If 'fa' (law) is appreciated not as an end in itself but also as the
embodiment of both justice and development, good governance would be
further entrenched. Singapore's central concern with good governance and the
intemationalisation of its economy offer the promise that universal principles
would eventually permeate into the non-commercial sectors. How soon that
will happen depends on whether the law is envisaged as having a role beyond
social control, social discipline and social engineering. Law has been a means
to an end since independence and it has served Singapore and her people well.
The next step is to treat law as an end in itself- that of engendering justice
and the development of legal rationality alongside economic rationality.
99 On the compatibility of Confucianism and human rights and that 'Confucianism values' are universal
values too, see Louis Henkin, 'Confucianism, Human Rights and "Cultural Relativism"' in Wm
Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming (eds), Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998).
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